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Paternalism, merit goods and speciﬁc egalitarianism are concepts that we
now and then come across in the literature. The thing in common for these
concepts is that the policy maker does not fully respect individuals’ pref-
erences but regards them as deﬁcient in some way. The decisions made by
individuals need to be corrected. Although fairly frequently mentioned in
the literature, there is not much formal analysis of the implications of these
ideas for policy making. Often verbal arguments have been used to derive
the implications. In this paper we attempt to close this gap by providing
a framework that covers all three ideas mentioned above and study the im-
plications for income and commodity taxation. The framework we provide
can also handle some other non-welfaristic approaches.
Paternalism is probably the concept with the oldest tradition going back
as far as Plato’s writings. The general idea is that (some) individuals do
not know what is best for them. Some other person with the power to
decide knows “better” what will be beneﬁcial for the individuals, and over-
rules their wishes. Laws restricting the behavior of individuals are often
motivated by paternalistic arguments. The concept is still much discussed
among philosophers as well as economists. For example, in the 2003 May
issue of American Economic Review a full session is devoted to a discussion
of paternalism. Thaler and Sunstein (2003) make a strong argument for an
important role for paternalism.
The concept of merit wants was introduced by Musgrave (1959). Accord-
ing to him (Musgrave, 1959, p.13) “Such wants are met by services subject to
the exclusion principle and are satisﬁed by the market within the limits of ef-
fective demand. They become public wants if considered so meritorious that
their satisfaction is provided for through the public budget, over and above
what is provided for through the market and paid for by private buyers.”
It has indeed been diﬃcult to give a strict deﬁnition in terms of properties
of the policy-makers preference function. Sandmo (1983) discusses decision
making in a context of uncertainty. Individuals’ information on probabili-
ties might be incorrect, whereas the policy maker has better information.
According to Sandmo this might provide the underpinnings for the policy
maker to use a merit good formulation of its policies. This line of reason-
ing resembles the ideas presented in Blomquist and Micheletto (2003). In
a model of age related income taxation they argue that individuals in their
decision making maximize their expected lifetime utility, whereas the policy
maker is interested in the distribution of actual lifetime utilities. In their
model it is true that the policy maker respects individual preferences, but
it is still the case that the policy maker maximizes another function than
what individuals maximize.
There have been attempts to capture the notion of a merit good in
terms of properties of a direct utility function. Besley (1988) proposed a
1formulation that was meant to capture the merit good aspect in a simple way.
However, as shown by Schroyen (2004), the Besley formulation is ambiguous.
Schroyen (2004) and Racionero (2001) provide still other ways to try and
capture the notion of a merit good in terms of a property of a direct utility
function. We will consider both in the paper. Another possibility that we
discuss extensively below would be to deﬁne a merit good as a good which
is such that its consumption should be encouraged by the commodity tax
system in some particular way.
The idea of speciﬁc egalitarianism has been presented by, for example,
Tobin (1970). According to this concept the policy maker, besides having
views on the distribution of income in general, has more speciﬁc egalitarian
goals for one or more particular goods. According to Tobin speciﬁc egalitar-
ianism provides an argument for public provision of the good in question.
Tobin did not perform a formal analysis and it is not obvious that his claim
is correct; for example, subsidies might provide an instrument as good as or
better than public provision. However, we will not study this issue here.
Whatever we would like to call the phenomenon, it seems as if actual
policy making often has characteristics that are hard to explain without
recourse to some of the concepts mentioned above. Some examples are
given by the public policies with respect to pension savings, education and
the use of alcohol, narcotics and tobacco.
With respect to pension savings there is a worry that some individuals
would save too little for their old age. To correct this behavior compulsory
savings schemes have been introduced. Sometimes subsidies to pension sav-
ings are used. With respect to the last three goods the worry is that people
would consume too much if left unrestricted. The public policy to try to cut
down on the use has in some cases been via taxes, but also by forbidding
(like for narcotics) or imposing physical restrictions so that only a certain
amount of spirits could be bought per month. A recent phenomenon is the
discussion of the role of fat and sugar for obesity. Some individuals might
be addicted to fat/sugar in a way similar to how people are addicted to say
tobacco or alcohol. A tax on fat and/or sugar has therefore been advocated.
We will not go into a discussion of under what conditions it is “right”
to base public policies on preferences that diﬀer from individuals’ ones, we
will instead focus on how optimal policies should be designed when the
policy maker has another set of preferences than individuals. We recognize
that such a framework might in principle imply that public provision of
some private goods represents a more eﬃcient solution than using taxes
and subsidies. Nonetheless, in this paper we limit ourselves to study how
optimal commodity and income taxes should be designed, leaving for future
work to investigate whether public provision would be part under some
circumstances of an optimal policy.
In contrast to some recent papers on merit goods we do not attempt
to capture the idea of merit goods by imposing some strong structure on a
2utility function. Such formulations seem always to be connected with further
restrictions than those embodied in the merit goods concept. Instead, the
general assumption underlying our analysis is that the policy maker uses
another function to evaluate outcomes than the one used by individuals.
We only impose the condition that the policy maker’s function is convex.
Using this formulation we are still able to obtain sharp characterizations of
commodity and income taxes. Our approach covers some of the merit good
models as special cases, but is also valid for other interpretations.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the general for-
mulation of the government’s problem. In Section 3 and 4 the main results
on the optimal mixed tax structure are derived and discussed. Section 5
discusses three special cases. Section 6 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
The model is a straightforward extension of Edwards et al. (1994) which in
turn relies on the two-types version of the Mirrlees (1971) model developed
by Stiglitz (1982) and Stern (1982). The economy is populated by two types
of individuals diﬀering only with respect to their (inalterable and) innate
(market) ability: type 1 are low skilled agents whereas type 2 are high
skilled ones. The diﬀerence in ability (output produced per unit of time
s p e n tw o r k i n g )i sr e ﬂected in the diﬀerence in unitary wage (w)t h et w o
t y p e so fa g e n t sa r ep a i d :w2 >w 1. Without loss of generality we assume
that the population of both types of workers is the same and we normalize
it to one. Agents have identical preferences described by a quasi-concave
utility function u(x1,x 2,x 3,L),w h e r eL is the labor supply whereas x1,x 2
and x3 are the consumption levels of the three commodities produced in the
economy.1 Production is linear and uses labor as the only input; units are
chosen to make all producer prices equal to 1. The government knows the
distribution of ability in the population but can observe neither L nor w,
while it can observe their product Y , earned income. Thus, the government
is prevented from optimizing the income distribution imposing, as it would
be ﬁrst best, lump-sum taxes/transfers conditioned on ability. Instead, the
government has at its disposal a general income tax T (Y ). The problem of
choosing the direct tax schedule can be equivalently stated as the problem of
selecting two pairs of pre-tax and disposable incomes
¡
Y k,Bk¢




, k =1 ,2. There is also a set of linear (more precisely, proportional)
commodity taxes/subsidies: linearity follows from the assumption that the
government can only observe anonymous transactions. Good 3 is chosen as
1In order to characterize the structure of indirect taxation we need a model with at
least three goods: one good that is used as numéraire a n dw i t hat a xr a t en o r m a l i z e d
to zero, one good that can be a merit/demerit good and one good that is neither the
numéraire nor the merit/demerit good. No further qualitative insights are obtained by
having a model with more than three goods.
3numéraire and set untaxed. The design of the indirect tax structure is then
reduced to the selection of the appropriate commodity taxes/subsidies t1
and t2 on good 1 and 2, the consumer prices of which will be denoted by qi
(qi =1+ti, i =1 ,2).
Before presenting formally the government’s problem, we need to intro-
duce some more notation. We denote by V (q1,q 2,B,Y;w) the conditional
indirect utility obtained, for a given labor supply and for preferences de-
scribed by u(·), by optimally allocating a ﬁxed amount of expenditure B
over the consumption goods:













The indirect utility is then obtained by choosing optimally labor supply
in order to maximize V (q1,q 2,B,Y;w) subject to the link between pre-
tax earnings and post-tax earnings available for goods expenditure implied
by the direct tax schedule: B = Y − T (Y ). Using subscripts to denote
derivatives, this gives −VY
VB =1−
∂T(Y )
∂Y w h i c ha l l o w su st od e ﬁne implicitly
the marginal income tax rate
∂T(Y )







where MRSYB stands for marginal rate of substitution between Y and B.2
2.1 The government’s problem
We assume that for some reason the government does not respect the con-
sumer sovereignty principle and evaluates individuals’ well-being using a
functional form diﬀerent from u(·). We denote this function by e u(x1,x 2,x 3,L)
and assume that it is quasi-concave. Corresponding to this direct utility
function we can also deﬁne for k =1 ,2 the following indirect utility func-
tion:























where it should be stressed that the arguments in e u are the demands gen-
erated by utility-maximizing individuals whose preferences are represented
2It is well known that with a ﬁnite group of individuals an optimal tax function is gen-
erally nondiﬀerentiable at the points at which the schedule is actually observed. However,
since the utility functions are assumed to be diﬀerentiable, even if marginal income tax
rates are not well deﬁned at an optimal allocation it is possible to deﬁne implicit (shadow)
marginal tax rates using the marginal rates of substitution.
4by the utility function u. One implication of this is that we can neither
invoke the envelope theorem when taking derivatives of e V k nor apply Roy’s
identity to the function e V k.
The government’s problem is to design a Pareto eﬃcient tax policy that
allows it to achieve some redistributive goals (and eventually raise some
exogenous amount of revenue), given the assumed informational constraints
and given that it is government’s belief that individuals’ preferences are
“defective” in the sense speciﬁed above.
As usual, due to the non-linearity of the income tax schedule, the govern-
ment must design the tax system so that each ability type (weakly) prefers
the (Y,B) bundle intended for it to that intended for the other (self-selection
constraints). An individual that misrepresents his type is called a mimicker.
Following the relevant literature, we will limit ourselves to the so called
“normal” case in which the only binding self-selection constraint is the one
ruling out the possibility that the high-wage households mimic the low-wage
ones by earning the same income.3
Using a “hat” to characterize a variable when referred to a mimicker and
deﬁning:




,k =1 ,2, (4)









e V 2 ≥ e V, (δ)











where Lagrange multipliers are within parentheses, e V is a pre-set utility
level, xk
i represents demand of commodity i by an agent of type k and R
denotes the exogenous amount of revenue to be raised.
The ﬁrst order conditions are:
3The “Mirrlees-Spence” single-crossing property requiring that indiﬀerence curves in
the (Y,B)-space are shallower for high-wage households is assumed to ensure that only one
self-selection constraint binds. To focus on the case when only the high-wage household is
tempted to misrepresent his type, we will restrict attention solely to governments willing
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Notice again that in deriving the ﬁrst order conditions we were able to
make only a limited use of the envelope theorem. In particular, we couldn’t
apply it when taking derivatives of e u1 and e u2. The reason is that there is no
actual person who takes decisions maximizing e u(·) subject to a given budget
constraint: the quantities x1
i (i =1 ,2,3)a n dx2
i (i =1 ,2,3)a p p e a r i n g
as arguments of respectively e u1 and e u2 are optimal choices only from the
viewpoint of agents having preferences represented by u(·).
3 The Structure of Indirect Taxation
In order to get a better grasp of the structure of the optimal commodity
taxes we will represent it in several ways. Our ﬁrst representation is given
in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Denoting by hk
i the Hicksian demand for good i by an agent














































Proof. See the Appendix.
According to (6), the optimal commodity tax structure reﬂects a mixture
of self-selection motives and diﬀerence-in-preferences considerations.
The term on the left hand side of (6) is the discouragement index (Mir-
rlees, 1976), an approximate measure of the change in compensated demand,
6that is of the distortions, due to the indirect tax system. For a given com-
modity, it is positive (negative) when the consumption of the commodity is
globally encouraged (discouraged) by the indirect tax system.
The term labelled Θ0 on the right hand side of (6) is the one that one
would obtain in a standard two-types model without diﬀerence in preferences
between the government and private agents. It is well known from previous
analyses and it pushes towards encouraging (discouraging) the consumption
of a commodity complementary to labor (leisure)4 in order to relax the
binding self-selection constraint.5
To provide a better understanding of the term Θ00 and get an insight
in how a non-uniform commodity tax structure may usefully supplement a
non-linear income tax if there is a divergence between u(·) and e u(·),c o n s i d e r
the following. Assume that t1 = t2 =0and evaluate the eﬀects of a small
perturbation dti in the consumer price of the i-th good accompanied by
adjustments dBk = xk
i dti i nt h ed i s p o s a b l ei n c o m e so ft h et w ot y p e so f
agents at their original (gross) earnings.
Since we have assumed to start from a situation where t1 = t2 =0 ,
the proposed reform would have no eﬀect on the revenue collected by the








∂qj =0 . Moreover, as per-
ceived by both types of agents the reform would be welfare-neutral since we
have dV k = V k
qidti + V k
BdBk = −xk
i V k
Bdti + V k
Bxk
i dti =0 .
However, from the policy maker’s perspective the proposed reform would
make a diﬀerence, even neglecting the possible eﬀects on the binding self-
selection constraint. The reason is that it would change the government’s






















































Thus, in assessing the costs and beneﬁts of a revenue-neutral compen-
sated increase in one of the commodity tax rates the policy maker has to
consider also the additional eﬀects captured by (7). The term Θ00 plays ex-
actly this role as it is immediate to recognize that the terms appearing in
Θ00 descend from (7) dividing de uk by dti and taking into account that in the
4In this context the expressions “complementary to labour” and “complementary to
leisure” correspond respectively to the notions of “negatively related to leisure” and “neg-
atively related to labour” as deﬁned by Pollak (1969).
5See Edwards et al. (1994) for further details.
7Lagrangian of the government’s problem a multiplier δ is attached to the
well-being of the high skilled agents.
It is also worth noting that eq. (6) implies that the Atkinson-Stiglitz
(1976) theorem breaks down in the present context.6
Another perspective of the structure of the optimal commodity tax is
obtained if exploiting the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix we rewrite the








∂qi . We can then interpret the set
of equations represented by (6) as requiring that at an optimum the gains
from a marginal increase in the tax rate ti (right hand side of (6)) should
exactly balance its marginal cost (left hand side of (6)).
We can also express the optimal commodity tax structure in terms of
the marginal rate of substitution for the indirect utility function. Hence, let






= −Vqi/VB. This marginal rate of substitution
shows how much B must be increased in order to keep utility unchanged if
the tax on good i is increased marginally. For a “traditional” indirect utility
function as deﬁned by (1) this marginal rate of substitution also gives the
Marshallian demand. For the indirect utility function deﬁned by (3) this is
however not the case. Therefore, instead of using Roy’s identity to rewrite
Vq, we will use the identity to rewrite the Marshallian demand for good i as
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qi + xk




















































6As is well known, according to the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem, when individuals’ (ho-
mogeneous) preferences are weakly separable between leisure and other goods taken to-
gether, there is no need to employ indirect taxation in the optimum solution.
8So far we have not discussed how to deﬁne a merit good in the present
context. We believe it is natural to deﬁne a merit good in terms of the
diﬀerence between g MRS
k
Bqi and MRSk
Bqi. Hence, from the policy maker’s




qiB. According to the government’s preferences a marginal increase in
the price of the good requires a compensation (in terms of disposable income)
larger than according to the individual’s preferences. If g MRS
k
qiB >MR S k
qiB
for both the low- and the high skill types it might be reasonable to denote
the good as a global merit good.
Let us consider the case of a global merit good together with a couple of
simplifying assumptions. First, suppose that the self-selection term is not
binding (or that leisure is weakly separable from goods). Let us also assume
that there is only one good such that g MRSqiB 6= MRSqiB. Multiply (9) by
ti and sum over i =1 ,2. Then, if the matrix of substitution eﬀects is strictly
negative deﬁn i t e ,t h el e f th a n ds i d eo f( 9 )i sn e g a t i v ea n dt h ef o r m u l ai m p l i e s
that if we have a merit good, the good should be subsidized and if it is a
d e m e r i tg o o di ts h o u l db et a x e d .H o w e v e r ,i ng e n e r a li ti sn o tt r u et h a ta
merit good should necessarily be subsidized. Whether it should be taxed or
subsidized also depends on the self-selection term.
It might well be that for low values of xi(q,B,Y;w), it is the case that
g MRS
1
qiB >MR S 1
qiB. This might for example happen for, say, consumption
of gym exercises, swim passes or aerobics classes. However, above a certain
threshold of consumption it might be that the evaluations of the policy




other goods, like alcohol or cigarettes, it might be the case that if xi is
suﬃciently small g MRS
1
qiB = MRS1
qiB whereas if xi is large we would have
that g MRS
1
qiB <MR S 1
qiB. Under such circumstances it can very well happen
that g MRS
1
qiB >M R S 1
qiB and g MRS
2
qiB <M R S 2
qiB (or the reverse); then,
whether we would like to tax good i or subsidize it would also depend on
the relative proportion of high- and low skilled agents in the population.
4T h e M a r g i n a l E ﬀective Tax Rates
To save space we do not discuss the marginal income tax rates but instead
focus on the marginal eﬀective tax rates. The total tax paid at income Y
is τ (Y ) ≡ T (Y )+
2 X
j=1
tjxj (q1,q 2,Y − T (Y ),Y;w).F o rad i ﬀerentiable tax
function, the marginal eﬀective tax rate (METR) is given by:














The formula given in (10) applies more generally if the implicit marginal
income tax rate 1+VY
VB (see (2)) is substituted for T0 (Y ).T h u s :




































Using this deﬁnition we obtain:
Proposition 2 The METRs for high- and low skilled agents implied by the







































Proof. See the Appendix.
According to (12) the “no distortion at the top” result is violated by
the introduction of a diﬀerence between the functions u(·) and e u(·) into
an otherwise standard optimal taxation model: even for high skilled agents
the distortions brought about by income and commodity taxation do not
“average out” to zero.
For these agents the sign of the global distortion depends on the relative
magnitude of the minimum compensation required to induce them to (work
more and) marginally increase their gross income (dB2
dY 2 |dV 2=0= MRS2
Y,B)a s
compared to the minimum compensation that should accompany a marginal
increase in Y 2 in order to leave unaﬀected their well-being when this is
evaluated according to the function e u(·) ( w h a tw ed e n o t eb y g MRS
2
Y,B). If
the former falls short of the latter then (12) tells us it is optimal to let
high skilled agents face a positive marginal eﬀective tax rate, inducing them
to undersupply labor. A negative marginal eﬀective tax rate, providing an
incentive to oversupply labor, will instead be the optimal outcome when
MRS2
Y,B > g MRS
2
Y,B.
As regards the low skilled agents, the term labelled Ψ00 in (13) is well
known from previous research and it is due to the self-selection constraint
10faced by the government in pursuing its redistributive goals. It is posi-
tive because of the “Mirrlees-Spence” single-crossing property (see footnote
3). The term labelled Ψ000 is analogous to the term Ψ0 in (12) and its in-
terpretation proceeds along the same lines. The only diﬀerence is that its
sign depends on the relative magnitude of the minimum compensation re-
quired to induce low skilled agents to marginally increase their gross income
(dB1
dY 1 |dV 1=0= MRS1
Y,B) as compared to the minimum compensation needed
to leave unaﬀected their well-being when evaluated according to the function
e u(·) ( w h a tw ed e n o t eb y g MRS
1
Y,B).
5 A Comparison with Related Models
The general formulation of the government’s problem that we presented in
Section 2 covers as special cases the models considered by Racionero (2001)
and Schroyen (2004) in their analyses of an economy with merit goods. Both
authors want to capture the notion of a merit good by using an explicit
functional form from which it can be immediately detected which good is
the merit/demerit good.
5.1 The model by Racionero (2001)
Racionero considers a model with leisure and two goods and represents the
policy maker’s preferences as e u(x1,x 2,L)=u(x1,x 2,L)+f (x2),w h e r e
f is a concave monotonic function. If f0 > 0 she denotes the good x2
as a merit good. To exemplify Racionero mentions a good that increases
individuals’ health, but that individuals do not take this into account when
consuming the good. The tax on good 1 is normalized to zero. Given this
normalization she shows that if x2 is a merit good, as deﬁn e db yh e r ,i t
should be subsidized. It is also easy to show that x2 should be taxed if it is
a demerit good (f0 < 0).
The model Racionero uses is, in our view, misleadingly simple. As her
model only has two goods she can not study the implications of her func-
tional form for the tax structure in general. As we will show, in a model
with more than two goods, the tax/subsidy on goods other than the merit
good are also aﬀected by the diﬀerence in preferences between the individ-
ual and the policy maker. Also, her deﬁnition of the merit good is hard to
generalize to a setting with more than two goods. We believe the indirect
utility function is better suited to deﬁne what a merit good is. In the con-
text of Racionero’s model, with only two goods, her deﬁnition and ours are
consistent, but our deﬁnition also applies to a context with many goods.
Below we will study the implications of the functional form used by
Racionero, but, in order to be able to say something about the tax structure
in general, we consider a model with three goods. That is, we will as-
11sume the individuals’ preferences are represented by a direct utility function
u(x1,x 2,x 3,L) and the policy maker’s utility function by e u(x1,x 2,x 3,L)=
u(x1,x 2,x 3,L)+f (x2). It is obvious that given this functional form both
g MRSq1B and g MRSq2B diﬀer from the individuals’MRSqB implying that
there is a contribution to the tax/subsidy on both good 1 and good 2 from
the diﬀerence in preferences between the individual and the policy maker.
In order to characterize the structure of indirect taxation it is useful to

















































































For the case of f monotonically increasing the term labelled Φ in (14) pushes
towards encouraging the consumption of the (merit) good 2 and discouraging
(encouraging) the consumption of the commodities that are Hicksian sub-
stitutes (complements) for the (merit) good 2. On the other hand, if f were
monotonically decreasing, the term Φ would discourage the consumption of
the (demerit) good 2 and encourage (discourage) the consumption of the
commodities that are Hicksian substitutes (complements) for the (demerit)
good 2.




















∂t2 (> 0),w ec a nw r i t e












































































































































































From this we see that, although the functional form assumption to character-
ize the merit good is intuitively appealing, the fact that there is a diﬀerence
in preferences between the individuals and the policy maker does not only
aﬀect the structure of the optimal commodity tax rate on good 2, but it
also aﬀects the structure (and not merely the values) of the commodity tax
rates on the remaining (non-target) goods. In fact it is possible that good
1 should be subsidized to a larger extent than good 2. This illustrates, that
the Racionero deﬁnition of a merit good makes little sense in a context with
more than two goods.
Only under further strong assumptions we would obtain the result that
only the tax on the “merit” good is aﬀected by the diﬀerence in preferences
between individuals and the policy maker. The condition that makes the
contribution from the diﬀerence in preferences to the tax/subsidy on good



































That is, the sum of the policy maker’s marginal valuations of the “merit”
good, weighted by (compensated) quantity response to direct price change
(t2), be equal to the sum of policy maker’s marginal valuations of the “merit”
good, weighted by (compensated) quantity response to indirect price change
(t1). In a model with many goods the generalization of condition (15) would
be very restrictive.
To see how our expressions (12) and (13) for the METRs reduce to in


































dY k |dV k=0,
w h e r ew eu s e dx





∂Bk, i.e. the marginal eﬀect of an
increase in Y that is compensated by an increase in B so as to keep utility
constant. Moreover, since duk
dY k |dV k=0=0 ,w eh a v ea l s o :
de uk
dY k |dV k=0=
duk












dY k |dV k=0.
Under the functional form assumptions used by Racionero the METRs
























dY 1 |dV 1=0 . (17)
In (16) and (17) the sign of
dxk
2
dY k |dV k=0 depends on the relationship of
Hicksian complementarity or Hicksian substitutability between commodity




dY k |dV k=0< (>)0. Thus, according to (16) we have that





dY 2 |dV 2=0:i f
f is a monotonically increasing function (the case of 2 being a merit good in
Racionero’s model) the government will induce high skilled agents to under-
provide (over-provide) labor if leisure and good 2 are Hicksian complements
(substitutes). The reverse holds if f is a monotonically decreasing function
(what would represent the case of 2 being a demerit good in Racionero’s
model). Similar considerations apply for the METR faced by low skilled
agents with respect to the second term on the right hand side of (17).
7The expressions provided by Racionero for the METRs faced by diﬀerent agents take a
slightly diﬀerent form from ours due to the fact that in solving the optimal taxation prob-
lem she follows an alternative approach (the one used by Nava, Schroyen and Marchand
(1996)), linearizing for each individual the income tax schedule around the equilibrium
points and deﬁning in this way two virtual budget constraints, one for each type of indi-
vidual.
145.2 The model by Schroyen (2004)
Like Racionero, Schroyen tries to capture the concept of a merit good by
a special functional structure of the policy maker’s utility function. In the
Schroyen model there are three goods (and no leisure). Schroyen intro-
duces a total willingness to pay function in terms of the numéraire com-
modity. This function, denoted by F (x1,x 2,U) gives the amount of good
3 (the numéraire) required to bring an individual with preferences repre-
sented by u(·) to the utility level U when consuming x1 and x2 of the non-
numéraire commodities. For someone (the policy maker) with preferences





∂x2 measures the diﬀerence be-
tween the individual and the policy maker in the marginal willingness to
pay for good 2. A c c o r d i n gt oS c h r o y e n ’ sd e ﬁnition good 2 is a merit (de-
merit) good when µ(·) > (<)0. Finally, Schroyen assumes that there ex-
ists a threshold level x2 above which the marginal evaluation of good 2
for someone with preferences represented by e u(·) starts to deviate from
that of someone with preferences represented by u(·). Together, these as-
sumptions implies that the policy maker’s utility function can be written as
˜ u(x1,x 2,x 3)=u
Ã






The tax on the numéraire good (x3) is normalized to zero. Schroyen’s
informational assumptions diﬀer from ours (implying a diﬀerence in the set
of tax instruments the policy maker can use). He characterizes ﬁrst and sec-
ond best commodity taxes, but not the case with self-selection constraints.
He ﬁnds that both non-numéraire goods should be subsidized. Hence, if
the intuition is that the merit good is the only commodity that ought to be
subsidized, this is not captured by Schroyen’s model. In a sense Schroyen’s
model seems to be more restrictive than the Racionero’s model since the
former implies that good one, which is not the merit good, should be sub-
sidized. In Racionero’s model extended to three goods the non-numéraire
non-merit good x1 should be taxed or subsidized depending on the exact
properties of the individuals’ utility functions.
Schroyen does not have leisure in his model. However, it is easy to
adapt the Schroyen framework to the case where leisure is also an argument
in the utility function. The individuals’ preferences would be represented by
u(x1,x 2,x 3,L) whereas the policy maker’s evaluation would be according
to ˜ u(x1,x 2,x 3,L)=u
Ã





. It is straightforward to
apply our formulas for the indirect taxes and the METRs to this particular
utility function. In order to save space we do not pursue this exercise here.
155.3 Minimizing poverty: The problem by Kanbur, Keen and
Tuomala (1994)
Another case that can be analyzed using the framework of Section 2 is the
one of a policy maker concerned with the non-welfaristic objective of the
minimization of poverty. It has been claimed (see e.g. Kanbur, Keen and
Tuomala, 1994) that while conventional optimal tax literature takes into ac-
count the values of both disposable income and leisure in assessing individu-
als’ well-being, the policy discussion focuses almost exclusively on incomes.
This is just another example of situations when alternatives are evaluated
by a policy maker referring to something other than individuals’ percep-
tions of their own well-being. The problem of alleviating income-poverty
has been considered by Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala (1994) in a setting
with a continuum of ability types and where the government’s objective was
the minimization of some income-based poverty index. Here we adapt the
model we presented in Section 2 to restate that problem in a simpler way
that allows to derive more clearcut results. For this, consider the case of
individuals having preferences represented by the additive separable utility
function U = u(x1,x 2,x 3) − f (L). Using our notation, a setting where the
government is concerned with minimizing poverty (which amounts to max
B1) can be represented by letting e u(x1,x 2,x 3,L)=u(x1,x 2,x 3).I ns u c ha
case we would get the following results.
Since labor is separable from other goods in the individuals’ utility func-
tion, the self-selection term Θ0 in (6) cancels out; moreover, since the policy
maker “respects” the individuals’ tastes when considering goods other than
leisure, the term Θ00 also goes to zero. Commodity taxation would therefore
turn out to be redundant: ti =0 , i =1 ,2,3.
Since the policy maker makes only use of income taxation, the optimal
marginal eﬀective tax rates provided by (12) and (13) represent in this case
optimal marginal income tax rates. These are respectively given by:

































Moreover, given that the government is completely disregarding the
utility related to the availability of leisure time and taking into account
that for this particular speciﬁcation of the utility functions e V 1
B1 = V 1
B1 and
e V 2
B2 = V 2
B2, (18) and (19) take a very simple form reducing to:









































If the policy maker wished instead to maximize the disposable income
of the low skilled subject to a set of constraints including U2 ≥ U rather
than B2 ≥ B2 as we implicitly assumed so far, then commodity taxation
would still be redundant and the optimal METRs faced by low skilled agents
would still be given by (20). The only diﬀerence would regard the optimal
distortion imposed on the high ability type for whom the no distortion at
the top result (τ02 = T02 =0 ) would be recovered.
6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
Recently there have been several attempts of formalizing the idea of merit
goods and study the implications for commodity and income taxation. These
attempts have often started with postulating a particular structure on the
policy maker’s “utility” function in a way such that the policy maker’s utility
function is a fairly simple transformation of the individuals’ utility functions.
Usually this approach have run into problems. In this paper we take a
broader approach, not imposing other restrictions on the policy maker’s
utility function than that it should be convex. This approach covers some
of the earlier formulations as special cases, but can also represent cases that
we maybe would not like to call merit good situations.
Using the two-types two-goods version of the optimal taxation problem
we have explored the consequences for the structure of direct and indirect
taxation of a divergence between the individuals’ and the policy maker’s
utility functions. We have shown that the general structure of the solution
is rather simple. Typically, the tax/subsidy on a good depends on two types
of terms. First, the usual terms reﬂecting the eﬀect of the commodity taxes
on the self-selection constraint still play a role similar to the one in the
standard model. Second, there are terms reﬂecting the diﬀerence between
an individual and the policy maker in the evaluation of goods. We have
used several equivalent ways to characterize the optimal structure of indirect
taxes. In one characterization we use the marginal rate of substitution
between the tax on a good and the after tax income (MRSqiB). In this
characterization the self-selection term is proportional to the diﬀerence in
17the marginal rates of substitution between the low ability person and the
mimicker. The terms that reﬂect that individuals and the policy maker have
diﬀerent preferences are proportional to the diﬀerence in the marginal rates
of substitution between an individual and the policy maker.
We have also characterized the marginal eﬀective tax rates (METRs). As
compared with a standard model of optimal income and commodity taxes
there are now new terms in the expressions for the METRs for both the
high- and low skilled agents. These terms reﬂect the diﬀerence in MRSYB
between the individuals and the policy maker. An implication of this is that
the METR for the high skilled is diﬀerent from zero.
Although our study has not focused on how to deﬁne a merit good we
believe our analysis can contribute to a better understanding of the merit
good concept. Our understanding of the merit good idea is that in the
view of the policy maker individuals under-consume the merit good. To
stimulate the consumption of the merit good it should be subsidized. In the
past various authors have suggested speciﬁc functional forms of the policy
maker’s direct utility function to capture the notion of a merit good. None
of these suggestions have been successful. As shown by Schroyen, the Besley
suggestion had the implication that the merit good should be taxed. Neither
the Racionero nor the Schroyen suggestions implies that it necessarily is the
merit good that should be more subsidized than other goods. Although
very specialized and in some respects restrictive functional forms have been
suggested, they have not been able to capture the basic intuition about merit
goods. Our conclusion is that it is hard to formulate a model where only the
tax/subsidy on one good is aﬀected by the diﬀerence in preferences between
individuals and the policy maker. If one wants to use the merit goods
terminology we suggest a deﬁnition using the marginal rate of substitution
between a tax on a good and after tax income. In general, if there is a
diﬀerence in preferences between individuals and the policy maker, there
would be several merit or demerit goods.
7A p p e n d i x
To get the results stated in Proposition 1 and 2 it is convenient to rewrite
the ﬁrst order conditions of the government’s problem as follows:
V 1






















































qi +( δ + λ)V 2



















 = −ξqi, (25)
where ξ1
Y = −e V 1
Y + V 1
Y , ξ1
B = −e V 1













B − V 2
B
´
and ξqi = e V 1








Moreover, using Roy’s identity and Slutsky equation, (25) becomes:
−x1
iV 1
B − (δ + λ)x2
iV 2







































7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Multiply both sides of (22) by −x1
i and both sides of (24) by −x2
i and then
substitute the expressions for −x1
iV 1
B and −(δ + λ)x2
iV 2































































 − e V 1








To derive (6) substitute in (27) what ξ1
B and ξ2
B stand for, and then
simplify and collect terms.
197.2 Proof of Proposition 2











































Dividing by γ, substituting in (28) what ξ2
B and ξ2
Y stand for, and rear-






















































































(12) follows from the above equation and the deﬁnition of the METR
provided by (11) after having simpliﬁed terms on the right-hand side of (30).
Proceeding similarly for the low skilled agents, divide (21) by (22) and














































Dividing by γ, substituting in (31) what ξ1
B and ξ1
Y stand for, and rear-
















































































































(13) follows simplifying and collecting terms on the right-hand side of
(32) and noticing that the left-hand side of (32) is precisely the deﬁnition of
the METR provided by (11).
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